“You Shall Never Know Security” is largely a collection of speculative dark fiction.  I say “largely” because included in the collection is, believe it or not, a true story.   A story so incredible, yet appearing, as so many incredible things do, in such a modest form.  Look it up; it’s waiting for you, right out there in some can’t-believe-your-eyes, government-sanctioned, unedited official version, collecting dust beside the no-doubt hundreds of other cases that are adjudicated, set to record, and promptly forgotten each and every day.  Not to speak in cliches or repeat platitudes for the umpteenth time, but, while every court opinion is a “story,” in its way, this is one that demands a wider audience.

 

Presented, in unedited form:

 

 

United States District Court,

N.D.California

United States of America, Respondent,

v.

Lacy Melias, Petitioner

No. CR-60-416 RFP

April 10, 2011

Joseph P. Heller,U.S.Atty.,San Francisco,Cal., for Respondent

Lacy Melias, Pro Se Petition, acting for and on her own behalf

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DENYING MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2254

Patel, District Court Judge

INTRODUCTION

The petitioner in this case has filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to vacate and set aside her conviction on the ground that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel during her criminal trial.  Reading her petition broadly, by implication petitioner also suggests that the prosecution brought forth insufficient evidence to sustain a first degree murder conviction because her crime lacked premeditation.  Finally, petitioner also suggests that no reasonable fact finder could find that she was legally sane for the purpose of first degree murder.  This court denies petitioner’s motion in its entirety.

 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 

The facts in this case are not in dispute.  On or around December 1, 2007, petitioner Lacy Melias (“Melias”) invited Kevin Cloverton (“Cloverton”) to her home, located at 3036 30th Avenuein San Francisco’s Sunset District.[1]  Melias and Cloverton had been friends for roughly three years, although at trial Melias was cagey about the specifics of their relationship.  The two seemed not to have much in common.  Melias was a twenty-eight year old financial consultant who worked in nearbyDaly City.  Cloverton, at the time of his death, was a thirty-nine year old resident of San Francisco whose background and occupation could charitably be referred to as “unspecified.”  From the record before us, he appeared to be a habitually unemployed, homeless bohemian who frequented the notoriously seedy Tenderloin section west of downtown San Francisco.

 

Despite Melias’s and Cloverton’s incongruous lifestyles and living situations, the two met at the Folsom Street Fair three years prior and seemed to have developed a friendship over their mutual appreciation for “gothic” and alternative culture.[2]  Melias and friends of the decedent testified that Melias often brought the decedent food, got coffee with him, and took him out to night clubs.  Several of Cloverton’s friends testified that Cloverton spoke of Melias in glowing terms and was duly appreciative of the financial and moral support she provided.[3]  According to Melias and other testifiers, the two would spend their time discussing horror fiction, horror films, and other such material whenever Melias found the time to track down and converse with her longtime friend.

 

According to Melias’s testimony, this relationship continued unabated up until the night Cloverton was found dead in her apartment.  Melias had told Cloverton to come over to her house to “check out some new stuff” and generally “hang out.”  Unbeknownst to Cloverton, Melias also planned on murdering him.  Melias testified that Cloverton arrived at her house at some time around 7:30 p.m.  A witness who lived nearby further corroborated Melias’s admission, testifying that she remembered a rather “disheveled” man who fit Cloverton’s general description “shambling” down the street toward Melias’s apartment.  The witness, perplexed and somewhat frightened about the appearance of the man, further testified that she watched the man knock on Melias’s front door and enter Melias’s home.

 

What precisely transpired once Cloverton entered Melias’s apartment is less susceptible to a linear narrative.  Suffice to say, at approximately 5 a.m. the following morning (December 2, 2007), a neighbor called the police to report a loud disturbance coming from the Melias residence.  The neighbor testified that it sounded like somebody was “weeping through a megaphone or loudspeaker or something.”  The police who arrived at the Melias residence likewise reported an “unfathomably loud crying-sound . .  . like out of a loudspeaker.”

 

The two officers knocked on the door, and prepared to issue Melias a noise citation and investigate the possibility of a domestic violence dispute.  Immediately upon knocking they heard a “shattering” sound.  They knocked again and loudly demanded that Melias open the door.  The two officers eventually forced the door open after failing to receive any response.

 

The two officers found Melias in her kitchen.  At trial, the two officers described a chaotic scene.  The floor, table, and sink of the kitchen were covered with broken glass and sheets of book pages.  More significantly, Melias was holding a serrated kitchen knife.  The officers, with guns drawn, ordered her to drop the knife and submit to their authority.  The officers described her as “dazed,” but eventually compliant.  She dropped the knife and turned herself over to the police without fuss.

 

The details of Cloverton’s fate will be kept to its bare minimum, both out of court decorum and the likely possibility that Cloverton’s friends or family may one day read this opinion.  Suffice to say, Cloverton’s intact left arm and part of his right arm, sans hand, were found resting on the kitchen table, atop shattered glass and book remains.  His head was found on top of  the refrigerator.  Shreds of his small intestine were apparently found wedged into the faucet of the kitchen sink.  All five fingers of his right hand were found in different spots throughout the kitchen.  His right index finger was found standing upright out of the kitchen tile, up to the knuckle, appearing like, in the words of one of the officers, “a flower out of hell.”[4]

 

The San Francisco Attorney’s office, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 189, brought first degree murder charges against Melias for the “willful, deliberate and premeditated” murder of Cloverton.  Melias retained criminal counsel.

 

Melias did not dispute that she murdered Cloverton on the night in question.  In open court, she admitted to incapacitating Cloverton by hitting him over the head with several glasses and (more effectively) with a frying pan.  She described how she proceeded to eviscerate and dismember him after he had been knocked unconscious, resulting in the gory details recounted above.  Despite acknowledging her outright guilt, she consistently refused to plea bargain to the lesser-charge of second degree murder.

 

The only defense she raised was the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.

 

At trial, Melias admitted on the stand that she planned on killing Cloverton that night, and that she had been planning on killing him for several weeks.  She further testified that while she felt “terrible” about doing it, she was fully aware of what she was doing and that she knew it was “wrong” to kill him, “morally speaking.”  To support her insanity defense, her counsel focused on the following: her 1) lack of an identifiable motive; 2) the pointlessness of the murder; 3) the incongruity of her actions with the life she had been leading; 4) the sheer brutality of her crime; and 5) the “daze” the police found her in as indicative of some kind of mental defect.

 

Not surprisingly, the jury rejected her insanity defense and found her guilty of first degree murder.  She was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed her conviction.  The inartfulness of her pleadings aside, the court found that, as a matter of law, the jury was well within its discretion to find the murder to be premeditated.

 

We agree with the Court of Appeals.  While her motive remains somewhat unclear, this is not fatal to the jury’s verdict.  See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 750 (1981) (holding that, even though defendant’s motive was unclear, first-degree murder verdict was sustained due to defendant’s “planning and deliberate execution of his plan . . .”  ), modified on other grounds by People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762 (1985).  Sufficient evidence was presented to the jury for it to find her murder “premeditated and deliberate” for a first degree murder conviction, as Melias explicitly planned to and so did murder Cloverton in a spectacularly gruesome fashion.

 

Melias next argues that no reasonable jury could find her to be legally sane for the purpose of first degree murder.  This argument is wholly without merit.  To be found not guilty by reason of insanity, Melias needed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was ”incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense.” CalPenal Code § 25(b) (West 1982).  Melias could not find a single expert to testify that she was legally insane at the time of the murder.  Coworkers and friends testified that they detected absolutely no change in her demeanor, attitude or appearance in the weeks preceding the murder.  Melias, no doubt undermining her own defense, appeared professional and lucid at trial.

 

It is simply a hornbook rule of criminal law in Californiathat a defendant is considered legally sane if he or she is aware of the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of his or her acts.  See, e.g., People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 568–69 (1954).  Melias makes absolutely no claim – nor could she, given her own admissions at trial — that she was unaware of what she was doing.  She even acknowledged at trial that she was aware, at the time of murdering Cloverton, that what she was doing was morally abhorrent and indefensible.  The fact that she appeared “dazed” when the police interrupted her from further desecrating Cloverton’s corpse is hardly grounds for a showing of legal insanity.  It simply reflects her surprise at being confronted with police officers pointing their weapons at her, demanding she submit to their authority.

 

Finally, Melias’s attempt to couch her emotional indifference to Cloverton’s death as some kind of mental defect is similarly unavailing.  A “personality or adjustment disorder” can never constitute the sole basis for a finding of legal insanity.  Cal.Penal Code § 25.5 (West 1994).  The Californialegislature specifically passed this statute to narrow the availability of the insanity defense to only those defendants suffering from legitimate mental defects or disorders.  People v. Robinson, 72Cal. App. 4th 421, 427 (1999).  It would defy logic to exculpate Melias on the ground that, while she knew what she was doing was morally wrong, she was simply too indifferent to the suffering of others to be considered legally sane.  These are precisely the type of peopleCalifornia wants convicted.

 

 

CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

 

 

Melias’s current pro se petition brings forth an utterly unheard of new argument.  Melias argues that she was denied the assistance of effective counsel because her lawyers argued she was legally insane when she was clearly sane.  This is certainly a novel argument.  Typically, petitioners argue that failing to investigate the merits of, or failing to pursue, a legal insanity argument constitutes constitutionally-deficient conduct.  See, e.g., United States v. Ayers Jr., 2008 WL 5411576, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2008) (Fogel, J.).  To this court’s knowledge, Melias’s bold argument has never been made before.

 

There is a reason for this.  Her argument is nonsensical.

 

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to … have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.  This right includes the right to have reasonably competent counsel.  Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1196 (9thCir. 2005).  A claim of ineffective counsel requires a showing of 1) deficient performance by the petitioner’s attorney and 2) proof of resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  As legal representation is an art, and not a science, and is so heavily-dependent upon the factual and contextual circumstances of each case, courts must be highly deferential to the attorney’s conduct and presume that the attorney performed reasonably.  Id. at 688.

 

Melias cannot sustain a Strickland claim because she fails to show any possible prejudice.[5]  She refused to plea bargain.  She admitted that she planned and carried out Cloverton’s murder.  The court fails to see how Melias suffered any prejudice.  Legal insanity was her only attempted defense, a defense she now admits had no factual or legal merit.  She cannot now claim that because her lawyers brought a losing, last-ditch argument, she was somehow “prejudiced” when she had no viable alternative arguments to present on her behalf.  In other words, there is no reason to believe she would have avoided a sentence of first-degree murder had she admitted that she was legally sane.

 

At this point, the court must regretfully acknowledge that Melias apparently believes that a pro se petition is some sort of private correspondence between herself and our chambers.  Her brief is replete with exhortations not to publicly divulge any of the “facts” which support her contention of legal sanity.  She never states as such, but she seems to be distancing herself from the murder without identifying any other possible culprit.  For example, she states that she was too small and weak and lacked the medical knowledge to eviscerate Cloverton so thoroughly, uproot his finger into her kitchen tile, and stuff his innards in her kitchen sink.  Melias asks the court not to discuss any of this, “for our sake.”  She insists that we consider the “hole with room for tiny wings” that was discovered in the roof of her kitchen,[6] a hole incoherently described as “made that night upon its [] fleeing.”

 

Further, she insists upon the existence of some conspiracy, which “forced” her to falsely “admit” her guilt.  She faults her attorneys for not investigating this conspiracy while acknowledging that she never told her attorneys about it because she was “afraid,” although this court cannot divine what she was “afraid” of.  She raves about “evidence” contained in her kitchen wall that will “expose the world to the truth,” that is conveniently no longer available because her house has since burned down.  She offers the incineration of her house as “proof” of some kind of conspiracy.  Of course, the court declines to entertain such a reverse inference.

 

Melias herself seems to regret wasting this court’s time with this hokum, as the phrase “I’m sorry” occurs over 100 times throughout her brief.  She is sorry to Cloverton and his friends for “using him.”  She is sorry for what she has “done to this world.”  May this court humbly suggest one more thing to apologize for: she should be sorry for attaching bizarre photographs to her petition, photographs she alleges “proves” elements of her conspiracy theory but instead only serve to disgust and confuse this court.[7]

 

Finally, she points out that, since her incarceration, there have been several unsolved murders in the Sunset District, the details of which match some of Cloverton’s in terms of sheer outrageousness.  See Sunset District Residents Fearful After String of Gruesome Murders, S.F. Chron., Mar. 18, 2010 at 1 (describing a decapitated man found in his home hanging by his innards from a banister and a decapitated woman found in her home partially-eaten, with limbs “thrown about” her apartment).  Likewise, she places far too much emphasis on disassociated “unexplained” sightings – hodgepodged together from multiple sources of questionable veracity – from around the San Francisco area.  These sightings range from the mundane (“a huge bird”) to the crypto-zoological (garbled talk of a “huge swooping thing with . . . teeth inside it, closin’ like a compactor or something”) to the sublime (“I heard something speak to me in a language I couldn’t understand but a voice I understood”).  These murders and nonsense “sightings” are irrelevant to Melias’s claim.  If anything, Melias has perhaps unfortunately influenced a copycat killer or set of copycat killers.  If that is the case, then it is she is who is starting a cult.

 

Toward the end of Melias’s brief, she once again openly acknowledges her culpability, and even seems to vaguely threaten the officers of this Court.  Perhaps subconsciously acknowledging the baseless nature of her contentions and the futility of her arguments, she states that this is all “pointless” because when you “laugh at me and disbelieve me buut [sic] when you turn around in your shower Judge and see its wings, wings not too small anymore, a mouth where its ribs should be you’ll know you’ll know I’m right and you’ll be sorry and it’ll be too late.”

 

Let this be a note to would-be attorneys and pro se petitioners alike: this is not the optimal way to end your brief.

 

Petition for Habeas Relief is DENIED in its entirety.

 

Marilyn Hall Patel, District Court Judge for the Northern District of California.

 

 

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